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Background: Health workers’ motivation is a key determinant of the quality of health services, and poor motivation
has been found to be an obstacle to service delivery in many low-income countries. In order to increase the quality
of service delivery in the public sector in Tanzania, the Open Performance Review and Appraisal System (OPRAS) has
been implemented, and a new results-based payment system, Payment for performance (P4P) is introduced in the
health sector. This article addresses health workers’ experiences with OPRAS, expectations towards P4P and how
lessons learned from OPRAS can assist in the implementation of P4P. The broader aim is to generate knowledge on
health workers’ motivation in low-income contexts.
Methods: A qualitative study design has been employed to elicit data on health worker motivation at a general
level and in relation to OPRAS and P4P in particular. Focus group discussions (FGDs) and in-depth interviews (IDIs)
have been conducted with nursing staff, clinicians and administrators in the public health sector in a rural district in
Tanzania. The study has an ethnographic backdrop based on earlier long-term fieldwork in Tanzania.
Results: Health workers evaluated OPRAS and P4P in terms of the benefits experienced or expected from
complying with the tools. The study found a general reluctance towards OPRAS as health workers did not see
OPRAS as leading to financial gains nor did it provide feedback on performance. Great expectations were expressed
towards P4P due to its prospects of topping up salaries, but the links between the two performance enhancing
tools were unclear.
Conclusions: Health workers respond to performance enhancing tools based on whether the tools are found
appropriate or yield any tangible benefits. The importance placed on salary and allowances forms the setting in
which OPRAS operates. The expected addition to the salary through P4P has created a vigorous discourse among
health workers attesting to the importance of the salary for motivation. Lessons learned from OPRAS can be utilized
in the implementation of P4P and can enhance our knowledge on motivation and performance in the health
services in low-income contexts such as Tanzania.
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The World Health Organization (WHO) in its 2006
World Health Report Working together for health
points to health workers’ motivation as an important
determinant of the quality of health care. The report
defines health worker motivation as “the level of ef-
fort and desire to perform well” [1]:71, and empha-
sizes the importance of increasing motivation to
enhance performance. A growing recognition of in-
adequate quality of health services in sub-Saharan
Africa has led to the introduction of new tools
aimed at improving health workers’ performance. In
Tanzania, the Open Performance Review and Appraisal
System (OPRAS) has been introduced in the public
sector. Alongside OPRAS, a result-based payment
system, Payment for performance (P4P), is currently
run as a pilot in the health sector. OPRAS is imple-
mented in the public sector whereas P4P is for the
health sector only. Both OPRAS and P4P can be
seen as performance enhancing tools. OPRAS mea-
sures performance at the individual level. P4P also
targets individual performance but the measure is
whether health facilities or management teams have
reached the targets. Little or no research has been
carried out on the experiences with OPRAS, and we
know little about the relation between this tool and
motivation and performance. This paper focuses on
health workers’ experiences and raises three import-
ant questions. First, how do OPRAS and P4P relate
to theoretical approaches to motivation? Second,
how do these two tools articulate with health work-
ers’ own understanding of motivation? Third, how
can the lessons learned from OPRAS offer insights
of relevance for the implementation of P4P in
Tanzania? The overarching aim is to contribute to
debates on health workers’ motivation in low-income
contexts.
Health worker motivation
Motivation in general concerns a person’s reason for car-
rying out a particular task. It is necessary to distinguish
between motivation from external rewards and motiv-
ation existing regardless of rewards. Ryan and Deci argue
“[t]o be motivated means to be moved to do something.”
(italics in original) [2]:54. They state that intrinsic motiv-
ation implies “doing something because it is inherently
interesting or enjoyable” [2]:55, and that it is found
where work is performed “for the positive experiences
associated with exercising and extending ones capacities”
[2]:56. Intrinsic motivation is both situational and per-
sonal, and may hence vary between individuals as well as
from one situation to another. Extrinsic motivation
refers to “doing something because it leads to a separ-
able outcome.” [2]:55. Extrinsic factors encompassmechanisms expected to encourage a worker to increase
her/his efforts in the expectation of some form of reward
or in fear of coercion or sanctions, for example reduced
salary.
A much used definition of motivation in the health
sector is “an individual’s degree of willingness to
exert and maintain an effort towards organizational
goals” [3]:1255. This definition is based on the as-
sumption that individual behavior can be changed.
An influential approach to workplace motivation is
formulated through agency theory in economics, a
theory which postulates that increased alignment be-
tween the goals of principal (employer) and the
agent (employee) can be achieved if the principal
offers rewards to the agent. Eisenhardt points out
that agency theory refers to situations where “the
desires or goals of the principal and agent conflict”
[4]:58. The underlying assumption of the agency the-
ory is that rewards motivate workers to perform
better.
Health sector challenges in Tanzania
In many low-income countries the health workforce
is under serious stress from resource constraints, a
situation which generates particular challenges in
motivating health workers. A range of studies indi-
cate that there are major problems related to health
worker motivation in low-income countries [5-8].
Some studies discuss health workers’ motivation in
the Tanzanian context [9-12] and other studies link
poor performance to low motivation [13-15]. Similar
observations have been made in other countries [16].
It is therefore important to identify factors that im-
pact motivation, and the relation between motivation
and performance. A systematic review of health
workers’ motivation in low-income countries con-
cludes that financial rewards, career development,
continuing education, hospital infrastructure, re-
source availability, hospital management, and recog-
nition are core contributing factors [17]. Health
worker motivation thus emerges as a highly complex
issue. Gilson et al. state that health workers’ motiv-
ation “reflects a range of personal, organizational,
and societal factors, including relationships with
others, and itself influences many aspects of the
provision of health care.” [18]. The health related
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) constitute
measurable targets for health sector performance,
and reaching the goals has been given high political
priority in Tanzania. Improved access to health ser-
vices of good quality is the overall aim of the
National Health Policy [19], the Primary Health
Services Development Programme 2007–2017 [20] and
the Human Resource for Health Strategic Plan [21].
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improve the quality of services through expanding
the number of health facilities and health workers
and to increase access to resources. Moreover, there
is an increased focus on health workers’ performance.
It is partly to this end several performance enhancing
tools have been implemented.
Implementing OPRAS
In Tanzania, the Public Sector Reform Programme
(PSRP) aims at improving public sector service deliv-
ery. The Open Performance Review and Appraisal
System (OPRAS) was introduced in 2004 [21]:11,
and replaced a former confidential performance ap-
praisal [22]:12, [23]:21. It is stated about OPRAS
that “[t]he introduction of this system aims at im-
proving the quality of public services in Tanzania”
[24]:252. OPRAS seeks to improve performance
through setting individual goals, measuring the
achievement of the goals and providing feedback. It
is argued that OPRAS makes up “an integrated sys-
tem for building a shared vision, understanding and
agreement about the results to be achieved, and the
approach, deployment, assessment and review of ac-
tivities for continuous improvement in standards of
service delivery” (italics in original) [24]:252. The
principle of OPRAS is that the employee sets targets
in consultation with the supervisor. After six months,
the achievements are to be evaluated and after
12 months the achievements of the past year are
evaluated and the supervisor and employee come to
an agreement on the performance to be recorded in
OPRAS.
In Tanzania, OPRAS was introduced in the wake of
the extensive Public Sector Reform Programme (PSRP)
and strategies vested in the New Public Management
paradigm following in the wake of the extensive struc-
tural adjustment policies. The New Public Management
approach has increasingly been adopted in low-income
countries [25], a strong manifestation of processes of
globalization. OPRAS plays an important role in the im-
provement of service delivery and the Public Service Act
defines OPRAS as a compulsory performance appraisal
in the public sector.
Introducing results-based payment
Results-based payment has been introduced in a number
of countries, and is marketed as a new and innovative
solution to combat low health worker motivation. A
general definition of results-based payment is the “[t]
ransfer of money or material goods conditional on tak-
ing a measurable action or achieving a predetermined
performance target” [26]:4. Trisolini argues that results-
based payment can be seen as a direct response to theprincipal-agent problem “by providing objective quality
measures” and by “linking payment to improvements in
performance.” [27]:80.
In Tanzania, Payment for performance (P4P) has
replaced a system of extra allowances to leadership
positions, the Selected Accelerated Salary Enhancement
(SASE) [28]:6. Donors have been instrumental in intro-
ducing P4P in Tanzania and the initiative to introduce
P4P has taken place outside the established collabor-
ation between donors who support the Health Basket
Fund. Morgan and Eichler report that the Government
of Tanzania “decided to implement a P4P scheme with-
out the endorsement of the country’s health sector de-
velopment partners” [29]. Two important official
documents on P4P were issued by the Ministry of
Health and Social Welfare (MoHSW) in 2008: the
Payment for Performance Strategy 2008–2015 [30] and
the Implementation Guideline Payment for Performance
[31]. It was stated that “the results-based bonus sys-
tem constitutes an important programme strategy
which will increase the ability to unleash the energy
and creativity needed to address local challenges.”
[31]:1, hence indicating motivational as well as per-
formance dimensions of P4P. The introduction of
P4P in Tanzania takes place in the context of the
Health Sector Strategic Plan III which states that P4P
will improve both motivation and productivity of
health workers [32]:5.
Rewarding health facilities for achieving set targets
requires very good tools to measure their perform-
ance. An appraisal study of the planned P4P clearly
pointed out that the state of the Health Management
Information System (HMIS) was far from being of
adequate quality [33]:14. Similar concerns had been
expressed by two feasibility studies preceding the
implementation documents [28,34]. These challenges
made donors concerned that the original plans for
P4P would be difficult to implement, and the ap-
praisal study warned against “harmful effects if the
programme is introduced too rapidly without careful
management” [33]:6. Because of the concerns voiced,
the process of implementing P4P was halted in 2009
[29]:24,25. Health workers in the study district had
however received extensive information about the
initial P4P plans before they later were informed that
the plans had been halted. Despite the official halt, a
P4P scheme following the initial plans is reported to
have been implemented in Mvomero District, Moro-
goro Region [35] as well as in some other districts
[29]:25. In 2010, a new P4P plan far more detailed in
terms of indicators and procedures for verification of
the data as well as in terms of procedures for pay-
ment of P4P bonuses was presented [36]. In contrast
to the previous plan of a simultaneous roll-out of
Table 1 Overview of IDIs with health workers (excl.
administrators)
Dispensary District hospital
Medical attendants 2 2
Nursing staff 4 4
Clinical Officer (CO) 4 2
Assistant Medical Officer (AMO) 0 2
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implemented as a pilot in the Coast Region. The
current situation of implementation of P4P alongside
OPRAS and a Health Management Information System
with shortcomings warrants a study of how both
OPRAS and P4P are conceptualized by health workers.
The broader aim is to enhance the understanding of
work related motivation and performance in the health
sector in a low-income setting.
Methods
Study setting
The research was carried out in Mbulu District in
Manyara Region in northern Tanzania. In terms of
livelihood and socio-economic conditions, the dis-
trict is a typical rural district in Tanzania. The pub-
lic health facilities in the district comprise a district
hospital, two rural health centres and 19 dispensar-
ies. In addition to the public health services there is
a large church-run hospital located in the district,
and the population thus enjoys a relatively good
coverage of health services. There is little indication
this has any influence on the working conditions in
the public health sector. There is a shortage of all
cadres of trained health workers but a surplus of un-
trained medical attendants in the district. The short-
age of qualified staff is most pronounced at health
centre- and dispensary levels. Many nurse positions
in these health facilities are filled by medical atten-
dants, a cadre with very little formal education. At
the time of the data collection there was no fully
trained Medical Officer (MD) in the public health
services.
Data collection
A qualitative study design was chosen to explore
health workers’ perception of motivation, their
experiences with OPRAS and expectations towards
P4P. The two main methods for collection of data in
our study were in-depth interviews (IDIs) and focus
group discussions (FGDs). The IDIs and FGDs were
carried out at locations providing the necessary priv-
acy to allow interviewees to speak freely. The first
author and several of the co-authors speak Swahili,
the national language in Tanzania, and have been
engaged in long term ethnographic fieldwork in
Tanzania. This competence serves as a backdrop to
the present study.
The formative phase of the research took place in
April and May 2007 and the main research topics to
be pursued were identified at this point. The bulk of
the data were collected during the second phase be-
tween October 2007 and February 2008. More tar-
geted IDIs in the public health sector were carriedout in May 2009 and additional FGDs with a par-
ticular focus on OPRAS and P4P were carried out in
May 2010. Interview guides and topic guides were
employed in all IDIs and FGDs, and were applied
with great flexibility to allow for time to be spent on
important or emerging issues. The focus on OPRAS
and P4P was increased in the IDI and FGDs during
the course of data collection. Documents collected
during the course of the research period were also
systematically reviewed. Government documents in
English and Swahili provided useful data on relevant
legislation and government policies related to the
human resource situation and to challenges in the
health sector. Annual plans and reports from health
facilities in the study district also provided useful in-
formation to understand the local human resource
situation.
At the time of data collection the OPRAS had been in
use for several years and P4P had been introduced to
the health workers in the study district. A general lack
of transparency related to issues such as salaries, allow-
ances and promotion policies led to difficulties in gain-
ing access to reliable information on both OPRAS and
P4P. The opportunity to express experiences and expec-
tations with the performance enhancing tools was wel-
comed, but the negative aspects may possibly have been
exaggerated.Research participants
Research participants were recruited to cover diverse
categories of public sector health workers, different
types of health facilities as well as both central and
rural parts of the district. The data comprise 20 IDIs
with various cadres of health workers and five
administrators, four of whom were Council Health
Management Team (CHMT) members and one was a
manager in the district administration. Six FGDs
were carried out at the district hospital with a total
of 29 participants. The IDIs and FGDs were carried
out in Swahili by the first author with the assistance
of a Tanzanian research assistant (Tables 1 and 2).
Table 2 Overview of FGDs
Participants Men Women
Nursing staff 5 0 5
Nursing staff 6 0 6
Clinicians (AMO/CO) 6 6 0
Nursing staff 5 0 5
Nursing staff 3 0 3
Nursing staff 4 0 4
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All the IDIs and FGDs were tape recorded, transcribed
and translated to English by research assistants. Thorough
checks on the translation from Swahili to English were
carried by the first author to reduce the risk of misinter-
pretation of the data. Audio files, transcripts of audio files
and research notes were managed by NVivo 8 and NVivo
9 for systematic data management and analysis. The ma-
terial was subject to a thorough review and coding of the
content. The data analysis followed the four steps sug-
gested by Malterud [37]:111. The first step is to identify
the broader themes present in the data. The second
step is to assign codes to the data. The third step is
to develop a structured set of codes. The fourth step
requires reflection to systematise the codes into larger
units, or categories.Research ethics
The study is part of a collaborative research venture
funded by the Research Council of Norway entitled
Strengthening human resources for health: A study of
health worker availability and performance in Tanzania.
The National Institute of Medical Research (NIMR) in
Tanzania granted ethical clearance for the project (ref.
NIMR/HQ/r.8a/Vol. IX/433). Permission was also
obtained from the Tanzania Commission for Science and
Technology (COSTECH) (2007-59-CC-2006-193, with
extensions 2008-181-ER-2006-193 and 2009-250-ER-
2006-193). A letter from the Regional Administrative
Secretary was presented to the administration in the
study district. All informants participating in the IDIs
and FGDs received information about the research and
about the voluntary nature of the research both verbally
and in writing before signing a consent form, complying
with the regulations of the Tanzania National Health
Research Forum [38]:25-30.Results
In this section we will explore what health workers in
the study district held as important for motivation, their
experiences with OPRAS and expectations towards P4P.Perceptions of motivation
The interviewed health workers used two Swahili
terms for motivation. The most frequently used term
was motisha, denoting the employer’s effort to motiv-
ate staff through offering incentives. The other term
used to describe motivation was hamasa, a term that
can be translated as ‘determination for work’. One
Nursing Officer made a clear distinction between
being motivated because of working conditions with
reference to motisha and being motivated as a calling,
or hamasa:
This work requires a calling. If one bases the work on
the salary alone, then one would say ‘why worry with
such little pay?’ But if the person is committed whole-
heartedly to the serve the patients, then he/she can
perform the work well even though the payment is
poor. (Nursing Officer, district hospital, IDI)
Health workers readily acknowledged that work effort
varies and they pointed out a number of issues they con-
sider motivating for effort at the workplace.
Salary and allowances
All the interviewed health workers emphasized that a
decent salary is very important for their motivation. It
was consistently argued that the basic salary is too low
to make ends meet. One Assistant Medical Officer
(AMO) explained that:
If people really want us to provide good health
services, the health workers should be paid a
reasonable salary, enough to meet the basic important
requirements, at least enough to be able to send
children to school and have decent clothing. (AMO,
district hospital, IDI)
The role of financial incentives was also explained:
If you get something in addition to the salary you will
maintain a high level of performance and have more
zeal. (AMO, district hospital, IDI)
The general experience of receiving a low salary gen-
erated discontent and demands for additions to the
salary. A recurring comment was that a low salary
and a high workload make staff demotivated. A nurse
commented on the importance of additional payment
for working morale:
When one gets an extra income then certainly one
becomes motivated and performs work better.
Working continuously without any improvement of
the income and with an increasing workload, one
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or reduced. (Nurse, district hospital, FGD)
In addition to the concern about the salary, substantial em-
phasis was placed on the allowances, in particular the
entitled allowance when attending seminars, short courses
or workshops. One Clinical Officer (CO) explained:
When we are being trained in seminars we get good
allowances. Such an income could not be achieved in
a whole month of work, but it can be obtained in, say,
one week of seminar. (CO, district hospital, IDI)
The emphasis placed on the financial aspects of working
conditions, for example the salary level and the extra
allowances attest to the importance of motisha as vital
for motivation. Health workers however also emphasized
non-financial aspects of working conditions as vital for
motivation.
Recognition of good performance
Recognition of good performance was pointed out as
important for motivation. One AMO explained:
If a leader stands up in a general meeting of all staff
and announces that a certain group of people have
done very well, the people praised will become
motivated. (AMO, district hospital, IDI)
A similar argument was put forward by one nurse:
Even a simple letter showing that you have done well,
or even an expression of congratulations for the good
work would really give a person encouragement to
work. (Nurse, district hospital, FGD)
Health workers claimed that they do not receive regular
feedback on the work they perform and held this out as
a serious shortcoming of the workplace management.
Health workers however pointed out a few exceptions,
one being the annual 1st May, Workers’ Day, celebration
with the announcement of Mfanyakazi Bora, - the
‘worker of the year’. In addition to the public recognition
of having performed well, the awardees receive a gift in
cash or in kind. Several of the interviewed health work-
ers had previous experience of being selected as the
worker of the year. One CO explained:
If one of the staff is selected here, his colleagues will
work very hard so that they can become selected the
next time. (CO, dispensary, IDI)
A Council Health Management Team (CHMT) mem-
ber who explained that he had received a letter fromthe District Executive Director (DED) thanking him
for his effort and that this encouraged him to per-
form better and how it gave him the determination
to work better than before. Receiving recognition
from the patients was also held out as a motivating
factor. One nurse explained:
The gratitude from patients is also giving me
determination because it is an indicator that my
performance at work is good and helpful to the
patients. (Nurse, district hospital, FGD).
The interviewed health workers consistently pointed out
the importance of receiving feedback on performance and
also pointed out the importance of supervision. The
examples above attest to the importance health workers
place of being recognised for the work they perform.Perceptions of OPRAS
The interviewed health workers had gained experi-
ence over several years of filling in the OPRAS form.
The overall picture emerging from the data was a
high degree of skepticism towards OPRAS. The per-
ceptions of OPRAS however ranged from seeing it
as being of little value to perceiving it as a positive
development. The interviewed health workers, re-
gardless of their stance towards OPRAS, referred to
it as a system in which individual goals are set and
performance measured. However, the interviewed
health workers raised a series of concerns about
whether OPRAS is reaching its aim, and to what ex-
tent it is appropriate in the health sector.Number of patients vs. quality care
Many health workers expressed concerns about meas-
uring performance through OPRAS in a setting of
shortage of resources. A recurring argument was that
the shortage of resources at the workplace makes it
very difficult for health workers to reach their targets.
It was also argued that the measurements of perform-
ance in OPRAS are of little relevance and help in the
health sector.
The one who has attended 10 patients and correctly
diagnosed and treated them well has performed better
than the one who has seen 20 patients and made
mistakes or prescribed the wrong medication. The
important issue is not attending many patients but
providing correct treatment. (CO, district hospital, IDI).
One Assistant Medical Officer expressed clear
skepticism towards setting targets in terms of number of
patients in OPRAS stated:
Songstad et al. Globalization and Health 2012, 8:33 Page 7 of 13
http://www.globalizationandhealth.com/content/8/1/33I am supposed to see or attend 300 patients. What if
people in the communities hear that this is my target?
I don’t know how they would feel. It could mean that
we are praying for them to get sick so that we can
achieve our targets. I don’t get the logic behind that.
Should we go to the churches and mosques praying to
get more patients? (AMO, district hospital, IDI).
A Clinical Officer raised a similar concern:
On the side of a clinician it is difficult to aim at
treating a certain number of patients. We don’t want
people to become sick. (CO, district hospital, IDI).
The principle of using numbers of patients as an indica-
tor for performing well was hence met with skepticism.
Health workers repeatedly pointed out that the optimal
situation should be a low number of patients receiving
proper treatment.Missing feedback
OPRAS is intended to evaluate performance and to pro-
vide feedback to the employee. In practice, however,
OPRAS appeared not be used for providing feedback.
We would request that feedback is given to us,
because it is a difficult process to fill in the OPRAS
form. You do this work and you don’t get any
feedback. It becomes tiresome and meaningless,
wasting our time and effort almost for nothing,
feedback is very much needed! (Nurse, district
hospital, FGD).
A Clinical Officer brought up the challenge of verify-
ing whether targets in OPRAS are achieved:
At the end of the day I don’t think that there is any
person coming to inspect or to verify that you attend
the 200 children you said you would treat. (CO,
district hospital, IDI).
Experiences with OPRAS indicate that many of the
interviewed health workers do not see the benefits of the
system. One AMO explained:
Up to now there is nothing coming out of filling in
the OPRAS form. It is just like an order. After every
six months they tell us to fill it in and again. It is just
a routine but it has no meaning. (AMO, district
hospital, IDI).
The large majority of health workers interviewed
expressed great skepticism towards OPRAS and further-
more explained that they have little knowledge about the
use of the information collected through OPRAS. Thedegree of reluctance towards complying with OPRAS
indicates that dissemination of information on the per-
formance appraisal and providing feedback to health
workers has been insufficient.
Openness and opportunities
Some health workers did mention benefits of OPRAS
and it was repeatedly pointed out that OPRAS is a better
system than the earlier confidential assessment. One
nurse explained:
I think OPRAS is better because it is a more open
system. You can express or defend yourself, or if you
find that you may have been badly treated you have the
chance to complain. (Nurse, district hospital, FGD).
Other health workers expressed that OPRAS was an im-
portant tool guiding them at work.
It is possible for me to adjust myself at work. Where I
have been reluctant or where I have been negligent,
the in-charge may warn me before things get worse.
(Nurse, district hospital, FGD).
The most concrete examples of employees’ positive
evaluation of OPRAS related to promotions. In the
latter part of the data collection for this study some
of the interviewed health workers reported to have
received the expected promotions. One nurse
expressed her experiences with OPRAS in relation to
promotions as follows:
We were told that a worker cannot be promoted
without OPRAS, and that only when one has properly
filled in the OPRAS form can promotion be
considered. (Nurse, district hospital, FGD).
Members of the Council Health Management Team
(CHMT) and the Human Resource Officer in the
district generally praised OPRAS, and explained that
it provides an opportunity to evaluate the perform-
ance of staff, but remained vague as to its relation
to promotions.
Mid-level managers’ experiences with OPRAS
Managers at sections or departments in the health
facilities are responsible for working with staff mem-
bers in order to set and evaluate the individual goals
in OPRAS. Health workers reported to have job
descriptions but these descriptions appeared not to
be actively used to guide the work or to direct effort
to tasks important for the quality of health services.
OPRAS was perceived by the managers as an at-
tempt to operationalise the job descriptions but a
manager in the district administration noted that
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which OPRAS is expected to operate:
The employees do not yet understand OPRAS, therefore
it is giving them problems in filling in the forms
properly. Or you may find that a person is unable to
estimate the targets. Thus they may
fill in the forms with inaccuracy, while others
simply evade it. (Manager in district administration, IDI).
Also the managers brought up the challenges of measur-
ing performance:
The weakness of OPRAS is that you find that an
employee has a job description in which its target
cannot be measure or evaluated. (Manager in district
administration, IDI).
The mid-level managers reflected well on the dynamics
of OPRAS on OPRAS, on both its weaknesses and op-
portunities. They recognized health workers reluctance
towards OPRAS as well as the structural problems of re-
source shortages and the challenges this may cause in
implementing OPRAS.
Expectations towards P4P and its link to OPRAS
The planned P4P in Tanzania is based on measuring
performance through assessing whether quantifiable tar-
gets have been met at the health facility level. As
explained above P4P was not yet implemented in the
study area at the time of the data collection. The infor-
mants nonetheless had substantial expectations towards
P4P due to the information that had been disseminated
on the possibilities of additional payment. Health work-
ers expressed positive expectations towards P4P, and
perceived that the forthcoming financial incentives
would enhance their motivation for work. One nurse
explained:
It is encouraging because it is something extra, an
extra income on top of the salary. It gives hope to
workers that one may get an extra income that can
help the family, for example to pay for school fees.
(Nurse, district hospital, FGD).
The interviewed health workers however expressed vary-
ing degrees of knowledge about the background and ra-
tionale for P4P. They generally saw OPRAS and P4P to
be two connected systems.
When they introduced P4P they emphasized that we
should properly fill in OPRAS so that we could be
given the P4P payments. (Nurse, district hospital,
FGD).The initial plans for P4P were however halted, much to
the disappointment of the health workers who clearly
expected to receive additional payment when meeting
their targets. The high expectations coupled with limited
information created much confusion about the aims of
both OPRAS and P4P, and the possible connections be-
tween the two.
Discussion
Health workers’ motivation is a vital determinant of
the quality of the health services [1,39]. A general
and accepted premise is that motivated health work-
ers work with an effort to provide the best possible
health services under the prevailing resource situ-
ation. In settings where the availability of resources
is severely compromised, health workers’ motivation
becomes particularly vital for performance. Both
OPRAS and P4P are tools that aim at improving
performance, but do not address health workers’ mo-
tivation per se. However, health workers’ experiences
with OPRAS and perceptions of P4P can increase
our understanding of important dimensions of health
workers’ motivation in a low-income context. In the
following we will discuss how OPRAS and P4P ar-
ticulate with health workers’ perceptions of motiv-
ation and what has emerged as key challenges in the
implementation of the two performance enhancing
tools.
The importance of intrinsic motivation
As presented in introduction, the Self-determination
theory distinguishes between intrinsic and extrinsic
motivation [40]. Both intrinsic motivation and ex-
trinsic motivation are important for performance of
workplace tasks. Ryan and Deci argue that motiv-
ation can be conceptualized as a continuum ranging
from a motivation to intrinsic motivation [2]:61,
[41]:72. A generally accepted assumption is that
health workers, as any other employee, are placed
between the two extremes of this continuum. The
Self-determination theory assumes that satisfaction of
basic psychological needs represents the underlying
mechanisms of intrinsic motivation. It focuses on
competence, relatedness and autonomy as key aspects
of intrinsic motivation. Of particular relevance in the
study of workplace motivation is competence, and
Deci and Ryan argue that people “seek challenges
that are suited to their competencies, that are nei-
ther too easy nor too difficult” [40]:32-33. Related-
ness refers to interaction with other people while
autonomy refers to being ‘causal agents’ in one’s own
life. Thus a working environment where a staff
member handles the work tasks well, has good rela-
tions with colleagues and superiors, and where the
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conducive to increased intrinsic motivation. Intrinsic
motivation does not remain constant, but is influ-
enced a number of factors. If health workers experi-
ence difficult working conditions in terms of
shortage of resources or inadequate human resource
management one or more of the three elements of
intrinsic motivation may be compromised. Perform-
ance in the health sector encompasses more than
what is possible to measure through numerical indi-
cators. Thus it is very important to ensure that
health workers are motivated to exert effort also in
workplace tasks not measured. Intrinsic motivation
has to be upheld as it is in flux and exists in the
nexus between a person and a task.
OPRAS and P4P in relation to intrinsic and extrinsic
motivation
Both OPRAS and P4P can be seen as attempts to align
health workers’ goals to the goals of the employer. Both
tools are based on the principle that work performance
can be measured. P4P offers financial rewards to health
facilities having achieved set goals. OPRAS does not
offer concrete financial rewards but measuring individ-
ual performance is intended to be the basis for indirect
financial rewards, for example through promotions or
selection for further training. Our study indicates that
health workers have great expectations towards the
forthcoming P4P, but also that they are reluctant to-
wards OPRAS. P4P appears to be praised because of the
expectations of additional payment, whereas OPRAS
enjoys little legitimacy partly because health workers
claim that the system does not offer any tangible
benefits.
It is important to address the socio-economic con-
texts when attempting to unravel the dynamics at
work in health workers’ responses to OPRAS and
P4P. Justice importantly calls for approaches that ad-
dress “cultural settings in which policies and plans
filter down through stages of implementation to
interact with cultures at the local level” [42]:330. It is
argued that performance appraisals need to carefully
address the organizational context in which they are
to be implemented [43]:883 and the same holds true
for other performance enhancing tools. In order to
understand responses to and compliance with the
OPRAS and the perceptions of P4P, it is important
to look closer at the significance of the salary in the
discourse on working conditions. In a setting where
a health worker may be the only breadwinner in a
family with a large number of dependants, the salary
and any additions to the basic salary become very
important. Health workers interviewed in our study
consistently argued that their salary was too low tomake ends meet and that children’s school fees in
particular constitute a financial hurdle. Recent stud-
ies from Tanzania exploring what health workers find
important to motivate them at the workplace empha-
sise the financial part of the working conditions
[44,45]. Other studies from Tanzania and other sub-
Saharan countries have also found that health work-
ers strongly emphasise the role of the salary and any
additions to the salary for their motivation to work.
The practice of ‘chasing allowances’ in many coun-
tries in sub-Saharan Africa [46], i.e. to try to maxi-
mise the amount of allowances earned through
participation in seminars or workshops must be
understood within a context of experiences of a low
salary level. Health workers thus welcome the possi-
bility to earn extra bonuses through P4P and likewise
express reluctance towards OPRAS not providing dir-
ect financial gains.
National health policies setting the agenda at the
local level are informed by global strategies and pol-
icies. Both OPRAS and P4P have been implemented
through a top-down process and donors have been
instrumental in implementing P4P. National and
international policies have substantial impact on the
local health system. Gilson et al. argue however that
health policies and systems are “understood to be
constructed and brought alive by social actors
through the meaning they attach to (their interpreta-
tions of ) their experiences.” (emphasis in original)
[18]. The perspectives of social actors who construct
meaning around their workplace experiences help us
understand how motivation is a phenomenon shaped
in the local context. Our study found hamasa and
motisha to be two central concepts relating to motiv-
ation. Health workers referred to hamasa as a calling,
or inner motivation or determination for work. The
experience of finding the work meaningful through
good collaboration with supervisors, as well as the
patients, clearly seem to increase the commitment to-
wards work and thus stand out as an important as-
pect of hamasa. At the same time, difficult working
in terms of resource shortage seem to have a negative
impact on intrinsic motivation and this attests to the
argument that intrinsic motivation exists in the nexus
between a person and a task. Motisha is a concept
referring to various financial incentives. Attending
seminars and workshops with the entitled allowance
was perceived as part of the motisha concept. The
importance placed on external rewards through the
coming P4P and the lack of tangible rewards through
OPRAS clearly relates to health workers’ perception
of what is required to increase extrinsic motivation.
P4P thus seems to be firmly based in the domain of
motisha and health workers evaluate the system based
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it is not seen as providing direct tangible incentives
is thus not located in the motisha domain, neither is
it located in the hamasa domain.
Central to enhancing intrinsic motivation is recogni-
tion of good performance and the experience of playing
an important role at the workplace. Recognition is in
principle an external factor but it not conceptualized as
motisha in the health workers’ discourse. Health workers
however clearly expressed that recognition is a very im-
portant factor to increase determination, to give encour-
agement and to make the work more enjoyable.
Supportive leadership can make a staff member feel
valued and important at the workplace, and is thus an
example of a mechanism that may nourish intrinsic mo-
tivation. The Self-Determination theory and its focus on
competence, relatedness, and autonomy attest to the im-
portance of recognition for motivation. Ryan discusses
the dynamics of motivation and the processes of intern-
alisation of extrinsic factors, emphasizing the importance
of a conducive environment and argues that it is “an on-
going process that is influenced by social-contextual
conditions in the immediate environment” [47]:420.
Ryan and Deci argue that “[c]ontexts supportive of au-
tonomy, competence, and relatedness were found to fos-
ter greater internalization and integration than contexts
that thwart satisfaction of these needs” [41]:76. The lack
of feedback related to the goals set in OPRAS thus im-
plies that important opportunities for increasing intrinsic
motivation are not utilized. We may sum up the dynam-
ics at work affecting intrinsic and extrinsic motivation in
the following way:
Challenges in implementing OPRAS
Performance appraisals are intended to be used for deci-
sion making related to promotions, access to training,
decisions on salary and termination of contracts. Thus, aNational  
health  
sector  
policies 
Recognition 
Performance based incentives 
Salary and allowances 
Infrastructure and drugs 
Access to training 
Promotions 
Figure 1 Impact of working conditions on intrinsic and extrinsic motiperformance appraisal is a constituent part of the wider
human resource management. The Council Health
Management Team members and staff at the office of
the Human Resource Officer claimed that OPRAS is
intended to play a role in assessing individual perform-
ance and for example to determine eligibility for further
training and promotions. This dimension of OPRAS did
however not emerge as clear to the interviewed health
workers. OPRAS could ideally be a system to provide
feedback on work related efforts, but this possibility
appeared not to be utilized. The negligence in filling in
the OPRAS form thus appears to be closely linked to
health workers not seeing any benefits in terms of tan-
gible rewards or concrete feedback on work. Collecting
and storing information on individual performance with-
out providing feedback seemed to undermine the trust
in OPRAS. Moreover, health workers question the way
performance in the health sector is measured through
OPRAS and it was warned against measuring perform-
ance through indicators such as counting number of
patients attended to. Health workers argued that setting
quantifiable targets may not be appropriate because of
the risk of a focus on quantity over quality. It was re-
peatedly stated that proper examination of each patient
should be the goal rather than the goals set in the
OPRAS form.
The Public Sector Reform Programme (PSRP) repre-
sents the context for the design and implementation of
OPRAS and other administrative tools aimed at ensuring
better management of resources, including human
resources. Issa argues that “[s]ynergy between different
initiatives has been observed both between the different
HR tools and the processes they are to improve” [48]:49.
However, an external evaluation of the health sector in
Tanzania states that OPRAS “is clearly an improvement
over the confidential reports, made by the superior
alone. But without clear job descriptions and individualIntrinsic motivation 
Extrinsic motivation 
Autonomy 
Competence 
Relatedness 
vation.
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[49]:85. The President’s Office – Public Service Manage-
ment states that OPRAS is not linked to sanctions or
rewards, and that performance targets are vague or too
easy to meet [22]:29. Another record from the same
office comments that “its standardised nature and in-
applicability to certain job groups; a perception that it
does not link to improvements in rewards; and the diffi-
culty of undertaking objective assessments in situations
where possibilities of collusion might be prevalent.” [50].
Moreover, it is reported that OPRAS is implemented
without coordination with the need for training of staff
[51]:4. The challenges in the implementation of OPRAS
are thus also acknowledged at the central government
level in Tanzania.
Lessons learned from OPRAS important for the
implementation of P4P
The introduction of Payment for performance (P4P) in
the context of a performance appraisal system not work-
ing as intended should initiate an evaluation of OPRAS
and a thorough discussion of how to coordinate the two
systems. No official document outlining the P4P modal-
ities, neither the initial plans [30,31], nor the revised
pilot [36] carry any references to OPRAS. The same ob-
servation is made of the preceding feasibility studies of
P4P [28,34]. Only the appraisal study of P4P points out
the importance of ensuring links between OPRAS and
P4P [33]:19. As both instruments aim at enhancing
worker performance, it is noteworthy that the introduc-
tion of P4P alongside OPRAS takes place with no men-
tioning of the dynamics between the two programmes.
Evidence from economic literature indicates that
employers can effectively improve performance by offer-
ing rewards increasing extrinsic motivation. Concerns
have been raised that strategies increasing extrinsic mo-
tivation through rewarding easily measureable indicators
may reduce the intrinsic motivation. Deci found that
“when money was used as an external award, intrinsic
motivation tended to decrease” [52]:105. It is argued that
introducing incentives aimed at increasing extrinsic per-
formance may have a negative impact on intrinsic motiv-
ation [26]:2. The risk of a selective focus on tasks being
rewarded has been pointed out by e.g. Rosenthal and
Frank who argue that “agents behave strategically, and
pay-for-performance programs need to be designed care-
fully” [53]:153. Golden and Sloan argue that “extrinsic
motivation may crowd out the effort that would have
been forthcoming in the absence of extrinsic motivators”
[54]:296. If only what is measurable is rewarded, this
creates a problem in the health sector as not all tasks
conducted by health workers are easily measured. If im-
portant tasks are not rewarded because they cannot be
measured, these tasks may be ignored and moreattention paid to tasks for which the health worker is
rewarded. Holmstrom and Milgrom argue that incen-
tives “direct the allocation of the agents’ attention among
their various duties.” (italics in original) [55]:25. A recent
study from Rwanda focusing on the effectiveness of
results-based payment schemes, found most effect on
services that had the highest payment rates and on the
services that needed the least effort from the health
worker [56]. A review study of results-based payment
found that the effectiveness of such programs is highly
variable [57]. In Tanzania, the effect of P4P on activities
not rewarded remains highly uncertain.
Our study has indicated that health workers in a re-
source constrained setting place substantial emphasis on
extrinsic motivation, in particular financial incentives on
top of the basic salary. Despite increased salary in the
health sector in Tanzania in recent years, health workers
strongly express dissatisfaction with the working condi-
tions and the financial return on the work. This creates
both opportunities and challenges. Health workers may
respond positively to financial incentives offered under
P4P, and may thus improve performance on work tasks
rewarded. This may lead to a higher degree of alignment
between the employer’s expectations and the employees’
performance which in turn may lead to increased quality
of health services. However, the nature of P4P is likely
to further accentuate the emphasis placed on financial
incentives at the expense of intrinsic motivation. This
should raise concerns about the current strategies and
their sustainability in efforts to improve health worker
performance in Tanzania (Figure 1).
Conclusion
The subjects of the performance enhancing tools, the
health workers, respond and comply based on their in-
terpretation of whether the tools are found appropriate
or whether they yield any benefits. The findings of our
study indicate that OPRAS does not work as intended
due to its modalities of measuring performance, the
poor implementation of the feedback mechanism and
health workers’ experience of not seeing any tangible
benefits of OPRAS. The expected additions to the basic
salary through the coming P4P scheme have created a
vigorous discourse among health workers attesting to
the importance of the salary level and allowances for
motivation. The implementation of OPRAS and the co-
ordination between OPRAS and P4P needs urgent atten-
tion to ensure that the lessons learned from OPRAS can
be drawn upon to improve approaches to enhance
health worker motivation and performance in the health
services in Tanzania and beyond.
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